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COMMENT 
When Alternative Dispute Resolution Works: 
Lessons Learned from the Bashingantahe 
ALEXANDER J. BUSZKA† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Societies have many ways to settle disputes and solve 
legal issues, but not all conflict resolution systems are 
created equal. Some systems are accused of being 
inaccessible because they are too expensive to use and 
confusing to navigate. Others are criticized for bias or unfair 
outcomes. Participants search for methods of conflict 
resolution that are the most predictable, accessible, 
equitable, and effective.1 Their options are limited, however, 
in view of various financial limitations, time constraints, and 
ability or willingness to navigate a threatening or 
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 1. SANDRA F. JOIREMAN, WHERE THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT: ENFORCING 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW AFRICA 15 (2011). 
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complicated system.2 
Litigation in the formal court system does not enjoy 
“unchallenged pre-eminence” in the field of conflict 
resolution.3 Around the world, participants engage in various 
alternatives to enforce compliance with legal or social norms. 
Often, these options include self-help, peer pressure, appeals 
to a community figurehead, or participation in a form of 
mediation or arbitration.4 
Some, such as the United States Department of Justice, 
praise the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the 
United States as an efficient, cheap, and effective method of 
conflict resolution that saves participants months of 
litigation and millions of dollars.5 However, the critics of 
ADR are numerous.6 They point to the rising number of 
motions to vacate arbitration awards and the increasing 
judicial scrutiny of arbitration agreements as a sign of 
growing dissatisfaction with ADR and how it is conducted in 
the United States.7 
In a way, both groups are right. ADR has a great deal of 
potential to resolve conflict without lengthy proceedings, 
high costs, or damaging relationships, while providing better 
access for participants.8 But the exact practice of ADR varies 
 
 2. See Penny Brooker, The “Juridification” of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
28 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 569, 582 (2007). 
 3. SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 26–27 (1979). 
 4. Id.; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. E.g., SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF 
THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE URBAN POOR 253–65 (2006). 
 5. OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2016 
ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter DOJ 2016 REPORT]. 
 6. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. 
 7. See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 247, 
252 (2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Why it Doesn’t Work and Why it Does¸ HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 
1994, at 120, 120–21. 
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widely in its methods and application. In some ADR 
programs, the process is unfair, it does not allow a sufficient 
degree of public accountability, and it may not even prevent 
participants from litigating in court afterwards.9 But, with 
significant variation comes a diverse selection of methods 
from which designers of ADR programs can learn and 
improve. 
The institution of the Bashingantahe10 in Burundi offers 
us these lessons.11 Like ADR in the United States, 
Bashingantahe have faced claims of bias or limited 
effectiveness, but the traditional functioning of the 
institution and its progress towards correcting these kinds of 
issues provide examples of how an ADR system can improve. 
Where the Bashingantahe show effective problem solving 
with transparent proceedings and public accountability, its 
methods and principles can offer solutions to the weakness 
of ADR. They also reaffirm practices that are already making 
progress towards the goal of efficient and fair conflict 
resolution in the United States. 
I will first categorize the different forms of ADR and 
summarize the growing prevalence of ADR in the United 
States. Then I will describe some of the most commonly cited 
benefits of ADR, before discussing common criticisms that 
follow from mandatory ADR programs and the informal 
nature of ADR. After introducing the background of the 
Bashingantahe and how they function today, I will compare 
how the Bashingantahe’s current ADR practices match with 
their espoused principles of their institution, and how they 
either improve or maintain their practices to better 
represent those ideals. Finally, I will draw out how the 
 
 9. Id. at 120–23. 
 10. See infra Appendix: Glossary of Terms, for an explanation of Kirundi 
words used in this Comment. 
 11. See Assumpta Naniwe-Kaburahe, The Institution of Bashingantahe in 
Burundi, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: 
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 149, 154 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 
2008). 
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Bashingantahe’s efforts to maintain and improve their 
institution provide examples of how ADR programs in 
general can increase their accessibility, equitability, 
fairness, and effectiveness. 
II. CATEGORIZING ADR 
ADR is an umbrella term for many different forms of 
dispute resolution that involve a third party to assist 
discussion, mediate negotiation, or arbitrate disputes.12 The 
uniting principle is that these methods are something less 
than formal litigation.13 ADR commonly refers to mediation 
and arbitration, but can also include judicial settlement 
conferences, fact-finding services, and private adversarial 
proceedings.14 Courts also use ADR to triage cases, through 
methods such as early neutral evaluation or mini-trials.15 
ADR methods fall into two main categories: voluntary or 
mandatory.16 Voluntary ADR is pursued by parties 
independent of a court’s order,17 and includes contracts to 
use ADR before, or in place of, formal litigation.18 Mandatory 
ADR forms a “‘mandatory settlement’ or ‘non-trial’ 
adjudicatory track,” where a court requires parties pursuing 
 
 12. Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Intell. Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 
61 (1992) [hereinafter Congressional Hearing on ADR] (statement of Stuart M. 
Gerson, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice); Brad Spangler, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (June 2003), 
https:/beyondintractability.org/essay/adr. 
 13. Iftikhar Hussian Bhat, Access to Justice: A Critical Analysis of Alternate 
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in India, 2 INT’L J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. INVENTION 
46, 49 (2013). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. ADR frequently covers civil cases including civil rights, environmental 
and natural resources, and tax law. DOJ 2016 REPORT, supra note 5. 
 16. Diane P. Wood, Court-Annexed Arbitration: The Wrong Cure, 1990 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 421, 428. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Steven A. Weiss, ADR: A Litigator’s Perspective: Viewing the Pluses and 
Minuses, Mar.-Apr. 1999 BUS. L. TODAY 30, 30 (1999). 
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full adjudication to first participate in an ADR program.19 
Mandatory ADR is often called Court-Annexed Arbitration 
(CAA).20 
A CAA requirement is usually found in state statutes, 
regulations, or court rules that establish which types of cases 
must be arbitrated before continuing to formal court 
litigation.21 CAA is often required for suits with money 
damages below a certain amount or that do not address a 
federal constitutional claim.22 CAA varies in its local 
application and some forms lack many procedural 
requirements compared to formal litigation.23 
Binding arbitration is more similar to traditional 
litigation than non-binding arbitration. Binding arbitration 
is where an arbitrator decides a case on the merits after 
presentation of evidence and arguments by parties.24 CAA is 
non-binding, so all decisions may be reconsidered by the 
court that ordered it.25 Each party may demand a trial de 
novo if it is dissatisfied with the arbitration result, at which 
point the case goes onto the docket and follows the 
traditional litigation process.26 
 
 19. Wood, supra note 16, at 428. 
 20. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49. 
 21. John P. McIver & Susan Keilitz. Court-Annexed Arbitration: An 
Introduction. 14 JUST. SYS. J. 123, 123 (1991); see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 651 (2012); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 36.400 (2015); 231 PA. CODE § 1301 (2006); In re Adoption of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2018); Standing Order, 
In re Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2010). 
 22. Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A 
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 
2177–78 (1993). 
 23. Id. at 2177–81. 
 24. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30. 
 25. McIver & Keilitz, supra note 21, at 123. 
 26. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 16 (statement of Hon. 
William W. Schwarzer, Senior J., United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California & Director, Federal Judicial Center). 
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Mediation, the other most common form of ADR,27 
usually involves a trained neutral mediator.28 Mediation can 
be conducted by one or several mediators, often chosen by the 
parties. In some situations, a neutral third party, such as the 
state bar, may also select a mediator.29 A mediator’s role may 
be strictly limited by the parties’ agreed-upon rules or by a 
court. For example, a mediator may not be allowed to request 
more information from a party than what is offered.30 The 
parties resolve the dispute consensually through negotiation, 
with the mediator attempting to facilitate discussion or 
address the underlying issues of the dispute.31 Parties may 
submit written statements or documents, make 
presentations, or meet individually with the mediator to 
realistically assess their complaints.32 
Often mediation is confidential, non-binding, and has 
informal procedural rules.33 It is also different from formal 
proceedings because it evaluates each case on its own 
individualized terms.34 
III.HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ADR IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
In the United States, the systems of ADR and litigation 
 
 27. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: 
Risks and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2012). 
 28. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Hon. 
John Leo Wagner, Mag. J., United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Oklahoma). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 25–26, 26 n.82. 
 31. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Hon. 
John Leo Wagner, Mag. J., United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Oklahoma). 
 32. Brooker, supra note 2, at 9. 
 33. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 31 (statement of Hon. 
John Leo Wagner, Mag. J., United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Oklahoma); Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 7. 
 34. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 3. 
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are intertwined because mediation and arbitration are 
conducted in view of pending litigation, potential litigation, 
and a court’s enforcement of arbitration results.35 So while 
ADR programs stand to gain from the continued operation of 
the court system, ADR persists in spite of it, due to the 
attractive promises of a faster, less expensive, and less 
tedious process.36 
In the United States, interest in ADR began to grow in 
the 1970s, stemming in part from concerns of an overworked 
judicial system.37 As the number of lawsuits filed in the 
formal court system increased, so did complaints of longer 
delays and procedural errors.38 The ADR movement centered 
around the effects of prohibitively high costs to use the 
formal court system.39 If an individual is unable to afford 
litigation, according to the argument, he or she is effectively 
no better off than if the government had actually abolished 
civil courts.40 
In the 1990s, commentators began to label the courts’ 
inability to efficiently handle the volume of criminal and civil 
cases a “state of crisis.”41 In response, parties chose to solve 
 
 35. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 581–82 (describing that the formal court 
system and ADR are not separate systems, but intertwined, because judges often 
refer cases to arbitration, or ADR is conducted in the “shadow” of potential 
litigation). 
 36. See Weiss, supra note 18, at 30. 
 37. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 1; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. 
 38. Spangler, supra note 12. 
 39. Besides being costly in time and money, the adversarial system can be 
inaccessible in the sense that it can be confrontational, confusing, and 
threatening. Brooker, supra note 2, at 3. While an attorney has an ethical 
obligation to communicate with and listen to a client, the client must still place 
a heavy reliance on the attorney to manage their case for them, due to specialized 
language and specific procedural requirements. See id. If a person cannot afford 
an attorney, he or she must proceed without such assistance. The concern over 
the confusing and costly formal court process does not belong solely to those who 
cannot afford it. Corporate clients also find litigation a burden, given the time 
and cost it may take to resolve a case. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30. 
 40. Wood, supra note 16, at 425. 
 41. Id. at 421–22. 
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their disputes outside of the courtroom.42 They increasingly 
took advantage of alternatives such as expert mediators, 
rent-a-judge programs, informal mediation, and grassroots-
level dispute resolution.43 Between 1983 and 1988, the 
number of providers offering ADR services increased 
tenfold.44 
The movement received positive media attention and 
government support as a solution to delays, expensive 
proceedings, and overcrowded dockets.45 President Clinton 
encouraged ADR growth by calling for federal agencies to 
develop ADR programs to make the government operate “in 
a more efficient and effective manner” and to encourage 
“consensual resolution of disputes.”46 
In response to favorable reviews of ADR, Congress 
authorized courts to engage in ADR.47 As its popularity 
increased, ADR’s principles and methods were embedded 
into the formal court system and private institutions.48 Amid 
some dissentions, many states and federal district courts 
joined the federal government in encouraging or mandating 
the use of arbitration programs.49 
 
 42. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2172. 
 43. See id. at 2172, 2187. 
 44. Id. at 2187. 
 45. Id. at 2172. 
 46. Memorandum on Agency Use of Alternate Means of Dispute Resolution 
and Negotiated Rulemaking, 1 PUB. PAPERS 663 (May 1, 1998). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (2012); see Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 
12, at 6–7 (statement of Hon. Thomas J. Moyer, C.J., Supreme Court of Ohio). 
 48. Sandra Kaufman et al., Should They Listen to Us?: Seeking a 
Negotiation/Conflict Resolution Contribution to Practice in Intractable Conflicts, 
2017 J. DISP. RESOL. 73, 75–76. Kaufman described the process of the adoption of 
ADR into the courts, government agencies, community organizations, and the 
workplace as a function of researchers promoting negotiation in dispute 
resolution practices throughout the twentieth century. The increasing 
commonality of phrases like “collaborative decision making” and “consensus 
building” in the workplace, and federal agencies adopting “negotiation-based 
conflict management practices” like mediation are examples of this. Id. 
 49. Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have The Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA 
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While formal systems, such as litigation, offer greater 
degrees of certainty and transparency, they can also be 
slower and costlier, and may not properly consider 
individualized circumstances.50 One litigator described some 
considerations when choosing ADR or the formal court 
system: 
On the plus side, it usually allows for a faster, less expensive 
resolution, and therefore a more satisfied client. On the minus side, 
ADR does not always allow a lawyer to delve deeply enough into the 
evidence, and in the case of nonbinding arbitration or mediation, 
can sometimes lead to a more expensive and slower resolution.51 
IV. ADR 
A. Benefits of ADR 
The proponents of ADR argue it helps to increase access 
to dispute resolution, preserve relationships among parties, 
increases efficiency, takes advantage of informality, and 
preserves consent in the process. 
1. Access 
Access to a dispute resolution system is critical to its 
success and legitimacy, and is a driving force behind the 
growth of ADR as an alternative to formal litigation.52 
Internationally, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) recognizes ADR as especially useful 
in countries where the judiciary has become untrustworthy 
or lost respect in the eyes of the citizens.53 But descriptions 
of courts with delays, high costs, and technical proceedings 
are as applicable domestically as they are abroad, and 
 
L. REV. 1055, 1055–56 (1996). 
 50. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See JOIREMAN, supra note 1, at 17. 
 53. SCOTT BROWN ET AL., USAID CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE 7 (1998), 
https://gsdrc.org/docs/open/ssaj1.pdf. 
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economic barriers prevent many from accessing justice.54 In 
this respect, ADR offers a way to access a method of conflict 
resolution for those who cannot or will not use the court 
system.55 
ADR can decrease the cost for parties to engage in 
dispute resolution and can be cheaper than a formal court 
proceeding.56 ADR is credited with taking less time to resolve 
a dispute and it may provide an alternative to a court system 
that some view as corrupt or biased.57 When ADR is 
organized and performed at the grassroots level, the shorter 
distance that parties are required to travel means a lighter 
demand on time and work.58 ADR’s procedures can be 
streamlined by agreement, allowing participation for those 
who cannot otherwise afford the time and expense of “full-
blown litigation.”59 Increased access to ADR benefits courts, 
which save administratively by dealing with fewer disputes, 
and benefits those who are normally excluded from the 
justice system.60 
2. Preserving Relationships 
ADR can help preserve or improve business or personal 
relationships through a conflict.61 Instead of having a winner 
and loser, both parties may come away from the negotiation 
more satisfied.62 The ability for parties to address each other 
 
 54. See id.; Wood, supra note 16, at 452–53. 
 55. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 7. 
 56. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 575–76; see Raquel 
Aldana & Leticia M. Saucedo, The Illusion of Transformative Conflict Resolution: 
Mediating Domestic Violence in Nicaragua, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1261, 1311 (2008). 
 57. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 56, at 1309, 1311; Bhat, supra note 13, at 
49; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 575–76, 580. 
 58. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 575–76; see, e.g., Aldana & Saucedo, supra 
note 56, at 1309. 
 59. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30, 33. 
 60. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 1. 
 61. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 120–21. 
 62. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 7. 
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neutrally, engage in fact-finding, negotiate over a solution, 
and focus on reconciliation gives ADR an advantage over 
formal litigation.63 The “win-win” advantage also gives ADR 
relevance to disputes between businesses or issues that 
parties would normally address in family court.64 
3. Efficiency 
Another benefit of ADR is its use to avoid delays and 
docket congestion.65 This, along with streamlined 
procedures, enables ADR to resolve disputes faster than 
formal litigation.66 With ADR, parties may be able to select 
someone with specialized knowledge of their specific case or 
the general subject matter, reducing the time it takes to 
explain issues to a judge or jury.67 Because parties can 
directly participate in outlining the process they wish to use, 
ADR can avoid lengthy proceedings, technicalities, and 
discovery abuse.68 
4. Informality 
The informality of ADR is both a benefit and a criticism. 
Some see informality as a method of achieving 
confidentiality in situations where a person or corporation 
would like to protect its reputation, while others criticize it 
as a secret proceeding.69 It also allows for an individualized 
result of the proceeding, according to the parties’ own 
 
 63. Aldana & Saucedo, supra note 56, at 1311; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 
580. 
 64. Kaufman et al., supra note 48, at 73; Spangler, supra note 12. 
 65. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; Weiss, supra note 18, at 33; see generally 
Carver & Vondra, supra note 8. 
 66. Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; Weiss, supra note 18, at 33. 
 67. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2239; Weiss, supra note 18, at 32. 
 68. Spangler, supra note 12; Weiss, supra note 18, at 33; Wood, supra note 16, 
at 452–53. 
 69. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2239–40; Brooker, supra note 2, at 5; 
Spangler, supra note 12; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570, 587. 
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relevant social or industry norms.70 
Informality gives mediators and arbitrators the 
flexibility to address the uniqueness of each case, which 
would otherwise defeat useful generalizations in the formal 
court system.71 It allows for creating solutions that are 
tailored to the parties’ precise situation and allows the 
ability to address unique features of a problem.72 The 
flexibility of ADR’s “individualized justice” is unavailable in 
the formal legal system and it allows “room for mercy in an 
otherwise rigid, rule-bound justice system.”73 
5. Consent 
Some forms of ADR are voluntary and require the 
consent of the parties to participate. This is an advantage 
because it can signal a willingness to cooperate and comprise 
to the other party.74 Voluntarily agreeing to participate in 
mediation or accept an arbitration result can improve 
compliance with an agreement because each party felt it 
contributed to developing the rules and procedures that 
governed the process.75 Requiring consent to participate also 
allows groups which are disadvantaged to engage in forum 
shopping for a less biased mediator or adjudicator and places 
an incentive on mediators and adjudicators to promote a 
solution that satisfies both parties. 
An effective ADR program is one that promotes access, 
preservation of relationships, efficiency, informality, and 
consent, while minimizing the costs associated with its use. 
 
 70. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 583–84. 
 71. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4–5; see Kaufman, supra note 48, at 75. 
 72. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4–5. 
 73. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons 
from Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 
58–59 (2004). 
 74. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2243. 
 75. Spangler, supra note 12. 
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B. Criticism of ADR 
ADR is no panacea, however, and there are plenty of 
situations where ADR has not produced its touted benefits. 
In some cases, it decreases efficiency. One example is when 
two companies let their “litigious habits worm their way into 
the process.”76 They went to arbitration before litigation due 
to a clause in their contract, and arbitration that should have 
taken six to twelve weeks “ballooned into a five-year 
marathon, with five to six hours of testimony four or five days 
every single week.”77 The judge also played a role—he 
started to subpoena evidence against custom. Lawyers began 
taking depositions, and the arbitration ended in an appeal to 
the court to overturn the arbitrator’s decision.78 
This example demonstrates one category of complaints 
lodged against ADR and specifically CAA: it merely adds 
another layer of litigation to the court system. A second 
category of complaints against ADR is its private and 
informal nature, which some argue is hostile to the rule of 
law and detrimental to achieving justice. 
1. Criticism of Mandatory ADR: CAA 
Commentators criticize that CAA is not very different in 
substance from litigation, particularly when parties and 
arbitrators act as if they were in court.79 The concern is the 
more litigious arbitration becomes, the more it reduces 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Despite this criticism, 
courts often mandate CAA.80 About 65% of cases facilitated 
by the American Arbitration Association are CAA.81 
CAA often effectively adds another layer of litigation to 
 
 76. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 121. 
 77. Id. at 122. 
 78. Id. at 122–23. 
 79. Id. at 123. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 124. 
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the court system when parties include “excess baggage” to 
arbitration.82 Excess baggage can appear in the form of extra 
motions, briefs, discovery, depositions, and expert 
witnesses.83 Lawyers in litigious arbitration make repetitive 
recitations of facts and legal arguments, cater positive 
publicity for their case, and act with the hostility of a 
lawsuit.84 Arbitrators may make arbitration more litigious 
by acting like judges or awarding damages that are beyond 
contractual limits.85 
Appealing arbitration awards increases costs because 
the parties might as well have gone directly to court. If 
parties treated CAA as a platform to litigate, then they must 
restart just to re-litigate the same arguments on appeal. 
Arbitration is then merely a pretrial expenditure.86 CAA also 
raises the cost of an arbitration appeal by reviewing de novo 
and awarding post-arbitration fees and cost-shifting.87 This 
is where, by statute, a party must pay the cost of the 
arbitrator’s fee if the result of the de novo trial is not more 
favorable than the arbitration award.88 The extra time spent 
in litigation is all the more futile where a party only lost 
arbitration due to the admission of evidence which would not 
be admitted at trail.89 Given the potential for an appeal and 
the greater “maximum out-of-pocket loss” a party might bear 
to request one, CAA discourages risk-adverse or poorer 
litigants who may otherwise bring a suit.90 
The non-binding nature of CAA solidifies its reputation 
as an additional layer to the court system. If a party appeals 
 
 82. Id. at 120. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 123. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Wood, supra note 16, at 449. 
 87. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2235. 
 88. 28 U.S.C. § 655 (1988); Wood, supra note 16, at 449. 
 89. Wood, supra note 16, at 449–50. 
 90. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2231, 2235. 
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an arbitration decision, it can use the information and 
arguments it heard and made to put itself in a stronger 
position to pursue litigation after arbitration.91 Given the 
increasing procedural formality of ADR, parties may use 
CAA’s procedures to delay the settlement of a dispute, then 
refuse to accept the arbitration award, as a tool to draw out 
litigation. This effectively reduces CAA to a tool lawyers may 
manipulate for negotiation.92 
CAA’s increasing cost, combined with the likelihood of 
continued litigation, has led to a perception that CAA 
interferes with parties’ right to trial and forces them into 
receiving “second-class justice.”93 The end result is the cost 
of ADR and litigation become very similar, which prevents 
access to dispute resolution.94 To this effect, several 
companies see increased damage awards, legal billings, and 
delays after using CAA.95 
2. Criticism of Private and Informal ADR 
Criticism of the private and informal nature of ADR 
generally falls into one of three categories: concerns about 
the inability of mediation to achieve social justice; lack of 
public accountability; or the quality and ethical control over 
mediators. 
a. Social Justice Concerns 
The informal and private nature of ADR raises criticism 
that it does not effectively achieve social justice, especially 
when cases are handled individually, each on its own terms, 
 
 91. See id. at 2227–28. 
 92. Brooker, supra note 2, at 14, 23, 25. 
 93. Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 20–21 (statement of 
Hon. William W. Schwarzer, Senior J., United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California & Director, Federal Judicial Center); Spangler, 
supra note 12. 
 94. Brooker, supra note 2, at 23; Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2253. 
 95. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 120. 
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in the absence of formal rules, and with less scrutiny.96 If 
ADR cannot achieve social justice, then ADR effectively 
sacrifices social justice to save administrative costs, which 
one author calls “an invidious policy that should be 
rejected.”97 
One facet of this issue arises when certain cases are 
categorically channeled into arbitration or mediation and 
parties are of significantly different power and status.98 
When a member from a disadvantaged group is forced to 
negotiate in mediation, the rules applied may not promote 
equality, and parties’ rights may be “nickeled-and-dimed” 
away without their consent, for the sake of compromise.99 
Mediators could intentionally or unintentionally steer 
parties into agreements that are unfair to them, given a 
mediator’s potential lack of information on the subject 
matter or lack of knowledge of a power imbalance between 
parties.100 
Even where mediators and arbitrators are striving to be 
fair, the “real world demand of client expectations” 
encourages them to pressure settlement to save time and 
money.101 Privileging “settlement per se” in this way, without 
sufficient attention to the quality of settlement, may 
disadvantage a certain party when a power disparity 
hampers its negotiating ability.102 
In this respect, the private and individualized nature of 
ADR presents a risk of failing to protect weaker parties with 
unequal bargaining power.103 According to one author, the 
 
 96. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 3. 
 97. Id. at 34. 
 98. Id. at 5. 
 99. Id. at 6 (quoting Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 
YALE L.J. 998, 1012–15 (1979)). 
 100. Id. at 8, 28. 
 101. Id. at 24–25. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059 (citing Owen M. Fiss, Against 
2019] WHEN ADR WORKS 181 
risk of a party, mediator, or arbitrator acting on prejudices is 
greatest in situations where there is a great power disparity 
and few rules governing the negotiation.104 In contrast, 
parties may be more hesitant to act upon prejudices where 
the formality of a court proceeding serves to remind them of 
“the American values of equality and fairness.”105 In these 
situations, the formality and publicity of litigation, instead 
of being a target for criticism, offers some protection for 
vulnerable groups who would otherwise be at risk for biased 
treatment.106 
Private ADR raises concerns about “micro-justice.” In 
this conception of social justice, “micro-level” justice is that 
which is aimed at the individual level.107 Macro-level justice, 
on the other hand, means “equality between groups,” “justice 
at the aggregate level,” and the cumulative effect of micro-
level justice.108 If injustices are recurrent, systematic, and 
consistently addressed at the micro-level, then all these 
individual cases add up to make changes at the macro-level 
to contribute to social justice.109 
The brunt of the criticism here is that because a private 
arbitration or mediation decision is not precedent, it 
disaggregates claims of collective injustice, which might 
otherwise succeed under legal doctrines of the formal court 
system.110 This claim has a historical basis, as mediation 
 
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984)). 
 104. Id. (citing Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the 
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1388–
99). 
 105. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570–71, 571 n.9 (citing Richard Delgado, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Conflict as Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 1391, 1398 (1997)). 
 106. Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059. 
 107. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 12; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570, 570 n.4 (citing David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622–23 
182 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
during the Civil Rights era “led enforcement agencies to 
overlook patterns and systems of discrimination,” poorly 
serving the larger goal of social justice.111 Without public 
records or public hearings, it would be difficult to ensure 
mediation or arbitration complies with or contributes to the 
protection of individual rights.112 
b. Public Accountability Concerns 
ADR systems are criticized for their unaccountability to 
the public. This stems from a lack of an “organic connection” 
to the communities in which they operate, at least in 
comparison to courts.113 ADR’s lack of accountability and 
informal nature has led some to criticize it as hostile to the 
rule of law.114 
There is also a concern that mediators and arbitrators 
are selected by individual parties, and not the general public. 
To the extent the procedures allow, the privately selected 
mediator or arbitrator applies rules, statutes, and interprets 
public values. Some argue that a public official should be 
interpreting and applying any public law or values.115 Public 
participation in the democratic process, after all, gives the 
public official the legitimacy to make these kinds of moral 
and legal decisions that a privately selected person does not 
have. Even where there is very little direct public 
participation in the selection of a federal judge, at least the 
 
(1995) (noting that private adjudications fail to produce rules or binding 
precedents)). 
 111. Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059–60 (citing Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses 
and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 482, 540–46 (1987)). 
 112. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. 
 113. Joseph A. Scimecca, Conflict Resolution and a Critique of “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution,” in CRIMINOLOGY AS PEACEMAKING, 263–79 (Harold E. 
Pepinsky & Richard Quinney eds. 1991). 
 114. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); see 
Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570, 570 n.4. (citing Harry T. Edwards, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 675–82 (1986)). 
 115. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570 n.4. 
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public has some opportunity to exert indirect control over the 
appointment. In the decision of who to hire as a mediator or 
arbitrator, however, the public has none. 
The private records created by ADR, or the lack thereof, 
are not subjected to public scrutiny like court documents. 
This removes another opportunity for the public to exert 
some form of control over the result, or at least future results 
of similar cases.116 Perhaps for this reason, many courts bar 
ADR from handling constitutional claims.117 
The issue of ADR disaggregating claims of collective 
injustice again becomes relevant. But here, the consideration 
is that the lack of public accountability makes information 
private that should be public.118 This private information 
could have been used by the public in similar, small stakes 
civil suits.119 Depending on the use of ADR, disaggregating 
claims can avoid collective litigation which would otherwise 
serve as a method of group mobilization and political 
 
 116. Spangler, supra note 12. Public knowledge of a case result can affect 
future, similar cases through its precedential value, encouraging legislation, or 
garnering public support for or against the decision. Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is referenced as an example of the kinds of public 
benefits that would be lost through the disaggregation of claims, if such a case 
was never public and courts were never able to use it as precedent. Bush & 
Folger, supra note 27, at 5; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 578. It is noted that civil 
rights cases are often a category of claims that are excepted from mandatory 
CAA, to prevent exactly this situation. However, the concern with some authors 
remains that channeling claims into ADR deprives that claim of having any 
potential precedential effect, which in these situations would greatly benefit the 
public at large. See Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. 
 117. See Congressional Hearing on ADR, supra note 12, at 10 (statement of 
Hon. Thomas J. Moyer, C.J., Supreme Court of Ohio). In some cases, the public 
interest may override the desire to go through mediation or arbitration. 
Sternlight, supra note 2, at 572 (“In the United States, even many of ADR’s 
staunchest advocates recognize that there are circumstances in which disputes 
are better resolved publicly, through litigation, rather than through negotiation, 
mediation, arbitration, or some other private means.”). One example is a dispute 
in which a constitutional right is implicated. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 
2177–78. These kinds of claims are likely best left to the formal court system. 
 118. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. 
 119. Wood, supra note 16, at 451. 
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c. Quality and Ethical Concerns 
Some point out there are few mechanisms or incentives 
in place to ensure ADR mediators are good quality.121 For 
example, if compensation for mediators is too low, service in 
dispute resolution will compete with other forms of pro bono 
activity, detracting from the pool of qualitied mediators.122 
Mediation especially relies on the mediator’s skill in 
suggesting alternative solutions, establishing trust, and 
assessing the interests of each party.123 If the quality of ADR 
mediators and arbitrators is poor, the entire mediation effort 
might fail.124 
One solution to this problem could be to professionalize 
the arbitrator or mediator corps, outside of the services 
offered by judges as part of local court ADR programs. 
Although requiring ethical standards or competency tests 
can produce some benefits,125 the corps should not become so 
formalized by the state that they lose the flexibility they need 
to adequately respond to parties’ problems.126 Formalization 
would mirror the disadvantages flowing from CAA: 
procedural protections are removed for the sake of efficiency, 
but the ADR program is not sufficiently informal to confer 
the benefits of informalism, such as an individualized, 
tailored decision.127 
If there is limited oversight of mediators and arbitrators, 
 
 120. See Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570. 
 121. Wood, supra note 16, at 447–48. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Weiss, supra note 18, at 32. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 14. 
 126. One of the primary concerns with a professional arbitrator corps is that it 
would become so regulated or formalized that it would essentially function like a 
“lower tier” of courts, not unlike CAA. Wood, supra note 16, at 447–48. 
 127. Id. 
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other quality and ethical issues may be at stake. If parties 
reduce discovery, like limiting a mediator or arbitrator’s 
ability to request more information, a decision may be based 
on an incomplete view of the facts.128 A decision based on 
partial information or the inability to discover that a party is 
concealing information, may result in a settlement that lacks 
substantive fairness.129 
Mediators and arbitrators are susceptible to the same 
temptations of corruption as judges and a biased mediator 
could have a significant impact on the ultimate negotiation 
result.130 The difference is that many ADR proceedings are 
conducted in private, whereas the publicity of a judge’s 
decision and proceedings can act as a check on his or her 
actions.131 Although parties may accept certain ethical risks 
as tradeoff for speed and costs, this risk may be justified by 
a degree of trust or experience with the mediator.132 
3. Squaring the Benefits of ADR with the Criticisms 
In devising a solution to the problems of formal 
litigation, one cannot just combine the formal and informal 
dispute resolution systems, because their values can be 
mutually exclusive.133 ADR programs begin to lose the 
benefits of informalism when the procedures begin to become 
more repetitive, burdensome, and similar to “litigation-in-
disguise.”134 The result is that like litigation, the costs of 
ADR rise, but without procedural protections or public 
 
 128. Weiss, supra note 18, at 33. 
 129. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 26. 
 130. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 587. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Pryor, supra note 7, at 258. 
 133. The end result of such a combination is a program like CAA. Wood, supra 
note 16, at 455–56. 
 134. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 123. Or what Carver and Vondra, call 
“let[ting] old litigious habits worm their way into the process.” Id. at 121. 
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oversight.135 These parties will witness the worst of what 
both ADR and litigation have to offer, without the any of the 
benefits. They “might as well go back to court.”136 
To maximize the benefits of informalism, while 
minimizing the costs, the goal should be to design a system 
of ADR that is democratic and publically accountable. It 
should be less adversarial and more conciliatory, but not 
secret. ADR can have formal recognition, but the government 
should not exercise recognition as a tool to centralize or co-
opt control of the mediators or arbitrators. 
The institution of the Bashingantahe in Burundi shows 
how to design such a system. The institution can 
demonstrate a way to maximize access to ADR, preserve 
relationships, increase efficiency, and take advantage of 
informality and consent. While the Bashingantahe have 
faced criticism for the practices of their institution, their 
efforts to improve, show how an ADR program might better 
contribute to social justice, maintain public accountability, 
and encourage quality and ethical mediators and arbitrators. 
V. BASHINGANTAHE 
A. The Institution of the Bashingantahe 
Bashingantahe are the group of individuals who are 
invested with the responsibility of settling conflicts at the 
village level in Burundi.137 They act as local peacemakers, 
performing the roles of mediators and arbitrators.138 The 
 
 135. Id. at 123. 
 136. Id. at 121. 
 137. The word Bashingantahe comes from the Kirundi word gushinga, 
meaning to plant down, and the word intahe, referring to a traditional staff of 
justice. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 154. Together, it means “the one who 
bolts down the law,” but is figuratively understood to be a person who is qualified 
to provide advice and administer justice and equity. Id. 
 138. Mutoy Mubiala, The Contribution of African Human Rights Traditions 
and Norms to United Nations Human Rights Law, 4 HUM. RTS. & INT’L LEGAL 
DISCOURSE 210, 230 (2010). 
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Bashingantahe have a moral and social responsibility to 
their communities and have historically been “the guardians 
of tradition and of good behaviour.”139 The institution’s 
legitimacy derives from a community’s investiture of these 
individuals as Bashingantahe and the Bashingantahe’s 
moral contract with that community.140 In 2010, an 
estimated 134,000 Bashingantahe operated in Burundi.141 
The institution functions differently from community to 
community, but Bashingantahe generally settle disputes by 
convening a council or panel of Bashingantahe at their 
colline, hearing a case, and offering a solution.142 
B. History of the Bashingantahe 
1. Bashingantahe as Traditional Advisors 
Traditionally, Bashingantahe were men selected by local 
villagers for the quality of being morally and socially 
responsible.143 The bundle of qualities that make up an ideal 
 
 139. NIGEL WATT, BURUNDI: BIOGRAPHY OF A SMALL AFRICAN COUNTRY 25 
(2008). 
 140. Patrick B. Litanga, Indigenous Legal Traditions in Transitional Justice 
Processes: Examining the Gacaca in Rwanda and the Bashingantahe in Burundi 
47 (Oct. 5, 2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Ohio University) (on file with 
OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations Center). 
 141. ERIC SCHEYE, NETHERLANDS INST. OF INT’L RELATIONS CLINGENDAEL, 
LOCAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENT IN BURUNDI: WORKPLACE 
ASSOCIATIONS AS A PATHWAY AHEAD 17 (2011). Although other sources also cite 
the 134,000 number, a survey taken on by the United Nations Development 
Program, completed by 2002, identified 30,411 “traditionally” invested 
Bashingantahe. Bert Ingelaere & Dominik Kohlhagen, Situating Social 
Imaginaries in Transitional Justice: The Bashingantahe in Burundi, 6 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 40, 45 (2012). The difference may suggest the difference 
between traditional and the total number of Bashingantahe, the growth of the 
institution between 2002 and 2010, inaccuracies in reporting, or a combination of 
all three. 
 142. Colline translates literally to “hill,” but it is an administrative unit that 
encompasses several hills, similar to a spread-out village or neighborhood. TRACY 
DEXTER & PHILIPPE NTAHOMBAYE, HENRY DUNANT CTR. FOR HUMANITARIAN 
DIALOGUE, THE ROLE OF INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN FOSTERING THE RULE OF 
LAW IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS: THE CASE OF BURUNDI 6 (2005). 
 143. Déo Makobero, L’institution des Bashingantahe Comme Moyen de 
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Mushingantahe is called bushingantahe. It is a broad 
concept, but roughly means “integrity” and respect for the 
common good.144 They looked over the safety of people, goods, 
and the environment, resolved conflicts, and had an 
administrative and educational role145 They functioned 
separate from the government and so were “a precursor to 
modern civil society.”146 
According to legend, the institution of Bashingantahe 
started in the seventeenth century.147 At that time, they 
were arbitrators, representatives of their respective colline, 
and advisors to the monarchy.148 The Bashingantahe formed 
a hierarchy of jurisdiction throughout the country, from 
resolving family conflicts in villages to settling matters at the 
king’s court.149 As an independent institution, the 
Bashingantahe acted as a check on government power and 
abuse.150 The members of the Bashingantahe had a 
“contract” or “mutual understanding” with their community, 
which created an obligation to model virtuous behavior, 
intervene in conflict, and protect the weak.151 
2. Weakening of the Institution during Colonial and 
 
Reconciliation, 1–2 AU CŒUR DE L’AFRIQUE 31, 31 (2001). 
 144. See Elizabeth A. McClintock & Térence Nahimana, Managing the Tension 
between Inclusionary and Exclusionary Processes: Building Peace in Burundi, 13 
INT’L NEGOTIATION 73, 86 (2008). 
 145. Makobero, supra note 143, at 31; McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 
144, at 86. 
 146. McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 86. 
 147. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 154; Litanga, supra note 140, at 49. 
 148. Dolive Gretta Kwizera, The Role of the Institution of Bashingantahe in 
Nurturing Good Governance and Socio-Economic Development in Burundi, 5 
INT’L J. INNOVATION EDUC. & RES. 151, 152 (2017); Agnes Nindorera, 
Ubushingantahe as a Base for Political Transformation in Burundi 1 
(Consortium on Gender, Sec., & Human Rights, Working Paper No. 102, 2003). 
 149. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156. 
 150. See id. at 164. 
 151. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 13. 
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Post-Colonial Periods 
Beginning with the colonization of Burundi by Belgium 
in the 1920s and continuing through a series of post-colonial 
military regimes, the Bashingantahe were weakened by the 
state.152 This was part of a trend where the government 
shifted the power of social control from the local community 
to the administrative center of the country.153 The public was 
distanced from the investiture process and the selection of 
Bashingantahe increasingly became dependent on 
government appointment, making the position more 
politicized.154 Although the strength and influence of the 
institution varied throughout Burundi, traditionally 
invested Bashingantahe155 had continued involvement in 
dispensing justice and leading reconciliation at the 
community level.156 
 
 152. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 158–59. 
 153. Mubiala, supra note 138, at 230. For example, the Belgians began to limit 
the role of customary law, and colonial authorities invalidated the 
Bashingantahe’s judgments. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 43; 
Kwizera, supra note 148, at 153–54. 
 154. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 44; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra 
note 11, at 159–60. 
 155. “Traditionally invested” Bashingantahe are ones that have gone through 
the traditional process of investiture by the community, as opposed to political 
appointees. Burundians commonly distinguish “real” Bashingantahe from the 
“false” ones, drawing a line between those who were selected traditionally and 
continue to follow the principles of bushingantahe, and those who were political 
appointees. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. Burundians sometimes 
qualify the title as “bashingantahe investi” for those who were traditionally 
invested by the community. PETER UVIN, LIFE AFTER VIOLENCE: A PEOPLE’S STORY 
OF BURUNDI 62 (2009). Burundians also distinguish the “old” Bashingantahe, who 
were invested in the era of the monarchy, from the “new” ones. Ingelaere & 
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. In some places, the Bashingantahe are 
venerated, and in others they are accused of being corrupt or ethnically and 
politically biased. Id. (describing the National Council of the Bashingantahe as 
“mainly dominated by urban Tutsi elites”). See MATHIJS VAN LEEUWEN, PARTNERS 
IN PEACE: DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES OF CIVIL-SOCIETY PEACEBUILDING 128 
(2009). 
 156. Sarah-Jane Koulen, Book Note, 53 J. AFR. L. 321, 323–24 (2009) 
(reviewing TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: 
LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES, supra note 11). 
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3. Genocide and Revitalization 
Starting in 1993, Burundi experienced a period of 
violence and inter-ethnic conflict.157 During the crisis, 
traditionally invested Bashingantahe showed their 
continued relevance through their ability to preserve peace 
and resolve conflict. Facing potential assassination, they 
protected victims of crime and persecution and organized 
communities to arrest killers and looters.158 Bashingantahe 
encouraged those who fled their homes to return, initiated 
reconciliation between offenders and victims, and returned 
stolen goods.159 
Post-crisis, there was a renewed interest in reviving the 
Bashingantahe, and the Arusha peace talks from 1998 to 
2000 recognized their historical role in promoting cohesion 
in the country.160 Nevertheless, after whittling down the 
Bashingantahe’s prerogatives over time, government 
reforms in 2005 took away their formal legal standing and 
removed the force of law from their decisions.161 Where the 
institution was previously centralized and incorporated as 
an auxiliary to the formal court system, now it had no legal 
authority whatsoever.162 
Although some of the Bashingantahe face allegations of 
 
 157. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 3–4. Like in Dexter & Ntahombaye’s report, 
the terms “ethnic” and “ethnic group” are used in this work with the recognition 
that they “do[] not correspond to the reality of the components of the Burundian 
population,” as there are still debates surrounding the origins of these groups and 
whether any differences that might have existed were originally ethnic, social, or 
something else. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 9 n.7. 
 158. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 160–61. 
 159. See id. 
 160. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 16; see generally Arusha Peace 
and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Aug. 28, 2000. For more information 
on the ethnic conflict and the Arusha Peace Accords, see McClintock & 
Nahimana, supra note 144, at 76–79. 
 161. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 12, 17; Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151. 
 162. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 154. One explanation for this action is the 
government perceived the Bashingantahe to be a threat to its legitimacy. SCHEYE, 
supra note 141, at 26–27. 
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corruption and partiality, in part due to vertical integration 
with the government, many continue to follow traditional 
practices, especially in rural areas.163 They remain a useful 
and strong conflict resolution institution, rendering 
decisions and retaining their place as a symbol of justice, 
despite being pushed into the realm of informality.164 They 
continue to hear a wide range of cases and serve as an 
attractive informal option before or instead of using the 
formal court system.165 This is in part because Burundians 
commonly see Bashingantahe as more accessible, 
trustworthy, and legitimate than other government agents 
and the formal court system. Bashingantahe are often more 
independent than local administrators and have an 
advantage over them, because they know the local context of 
the conflicts they mediate.166 
The Bashingantahe continue their role in the court 
system in an informal capacity. Sometimes local courts refer 
parties to Bashingantahe before hearing a case, or require 
parties to submit written minutes and decisions of 
Bashingantahe.167 Others use them as witnesses and experts 
in cases involving property boundaries.168 Those 
Bashingantahe who are invested traditionally retain their 
popular legitimacy in part because of the demand for 
addressing “past atrocities and injustice at the local level.”169 
 
 163. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 154–55. 
 164. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 159–
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C. How Bashingantahe Function Today 
Variation in the institution is significant, given the 
prevalence of local control over Bashingantahe selection and 
the influence of local tradition. However, some general 
trends are discernable. 
1. Investiture and Disinvestment 
This excerpt from a transcript of a Bashingantahe 
investiture ceremony introduces the idea of what is expected 
of a Mushingantahe once invested: 
If you pass by a place where there are conflicts, you must resolve 
them. You will stand for the honor of Burundi; you will not repay in 
kind to one who insult [sic.] you. . . . You will struggle for the 
orphans. You will be the rest for the lonely. Be courageous in 
helping the poor. It is only on this condition that God will assist you. 
Be aware that you are in the place of God and the King. Combat all 
laziness in your work. Be insightful during the deliberations; do not 
search for richness or material interest. You will be the straight 
path in which the country can trust.170 
With the exception of Bashingantahe who are given the 
title by government appointment, communities within local 
collines invest the title and responsibilities of 
Mushingantahe at their discretion. A community usually 
selects individuals as candidates when they reach the age of 
adolescence or alternatively, one may request to be 
considered in the selection process.171 
Communities then carefully observe the candidates for a 
period of time, usually between three months to three years, 
but possibly longer.172 The candidate is judged based on 
 
 170. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22–24. 
 171. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 11–12. 
 172. Id.; Makobero, supra note 143, at 31–32. While there is emphasis placed 
on an observation after becoming a “candidate,” a person’s actions and reputation 
from before that period are considered. For example, because an individual’s 
community observes and evaluates a child throughout childhood, it is more 
difficult to be selected if the child “did not obey his parents, did not like to work, 
preferred quarrels,” or “did not help the elderly or handicapped.” Nindorera, 
supra note 148, at 19. In some areas, a seat at the Bashingantahe council can be 
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certain performance measures, like the quality of his public 
speaking, how well he performs certain responsibilities 
during official ceremonies, and how well he debates and 
resolves conflict. Although the litany of desired character 
traits may vary slightly, communities also prefer candidates 
with wisdom, a high regard for truth, a sense of honor and 
dignity, a love of work, the ability to provide for the needs of 
others, sobriety, moderation in speech and action, and a 
sense of justice, fairness, the common good, and social 
responsibility.173 
In some collines, a candidate will need a considerable 
degree of wealth as a prerequisite for selection.174 In others, 
wealth is not a requirement or it may simply be preferred 
that the candidate is financially self-sufficient and 
independent, to resist outside influence on his decision-
making.175 Traditionally, a Mushingantahe would be 
required to have the means to provide beer for everyone in 
the community at the final investment ceremony, or else 
coordinate several people to share in the cost.176 
A candidate is assigned a Mushingantahe as a sponsor 
or mentor. The sponsor monitors the candidate’s behavior 
and instructs him on the customs and skills of conflict 
resolution in Bashingantahe tradition. The candidate is 
allowed to observe, but not participate in, deliberations and 
investigations of the Bashingantahe. 
The involvement of the community and the oath a 
Bashingantahe takes to follow the principles of the 
institution has a function of sealing a moral contract between 
 
inherited, or having a parent that is a Mushingantahe can give the candidate 
preferential treatment. Id. at 20. 
 173. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 155. 
 174. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 16. 
 175. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 49; Nindorera, supra note 148, 
at 20–24. 
 176. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12. 
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the community and the new Mushingantahe.177 The oath is a 
promise to follow and mediate disputes according to the core 
values of the institution, called bushingantahe.178 
Bushingantahe encompasses the virtues of righteousness, 
socialness, wisdom, self-control, responsibility to family and 
society, honor, discretion, equity, truthfulness, dignity, 
courage, and moderation.179 Impartiality, fairness, and 
respect for human rights and the common good are also key 
components of this set.180 
In practice, the application of these principles means 
calming the nerves of parties while an issue is being 
investigated or explaining at length the grounds for a 
decision.181 The Bashingantahe apply bushingantahe to their 
decision-making by emphasizing dialogue between parties, 
consensus, and collegiality.182 
It is key to distinguish that Burundian tradition 
prescribes consultation with the people, not nomination by 
the authorities.183 “Investiture is and always has been a 
 
 177. Barbara Vi Thien Ho, Post-Conflict Burundi and the Role of 
Ubushingantahe Council, AFR. FAITH & JUST. NETWORK (Jul. 17, 2009), 
http://afjn.org/post-conflict-burundi-and-the-role-of-ubushingantahe-council/. 
 178. The term bushingantahe is somewhat difficult to define, as it spans moral, 
cultural, social, and legal dimensions. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 
49. Bashingantahe see themselves as not only mediators following 
bushingantahe, but models of traditional and cultural values with the 
responsibility to pass them on to following generations. Kwizera, supra note 148, 
at 152. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151, 153; Litanga¸ supra note 140, at 49–50. 
Bushingantahe also includes certain skills and characteristics like public 
speaking, a strong work ethic, and economic independence. See Ingelaere & 
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 49; Litanga, supra note 140, at 49–50. “A sense of 
humor” is even included on one list. Litanga¸ supra note 140, at 49. 
 181. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 140, at 141. 
 182. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 153. Interestingly, Burundians use the values 
of bushingantahe to evaluate the quality of formal judges as well. Ingelaere & 
Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 50–51. 
 183. According to the traditional investment process, the community is 
involved in finally confirming a candidate, which functions as a contract with the 
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public affair” and opposition to one’s investment, made by 
any citizen, “regardless of their age or rank, can contribute 
to an application for the status of Bashingantahe being 
annulled.”184 Only with the community’s consent and after 
taking the oath, could someone become a Mushingantahe.185 
If a Mushingantahe began to act in self-interest, rather 
than for the common good, or otherwise violated his oath, he 
could face a temporary ban or be disinvested.186 The 
Mushingantahe’s oath also acknowledges that practicing 
corruption, sharing secrets, or committing other misconduct, 
could result in disinvestment or banishment.187 If banished, 
the Mushingantahe may be allowed to come back and rejoin 
the council after a period of time and after a show of 
repentance.188 Burundians continue the tradition of 
investment today and Bashingantahe continue to be invested 
in Burundi and abroad.189 
 
community and a source of legitimacy for the institution. At the final investment 
ceremony, the sponsor presents the candidate to the community, including the 
candidate’s family and representatives of the chief. Makobero, supra note 143, at 
31–32. Community members may object to investing the candidate. Id. The 
investiture must be supported unanimously, and even a child’s objection is 
considered. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12 n.19. Providing there 
are no legitimate objections, the individual is formally invested, and the 
community holds a festival. See id. at 12. Several speeches are made, including 
one by a delegate of the community, who expresses agreement with the 
investiture. Makobero, supra note 143, at 32. The new Mushingantahe is given 
an intahe, and takes a public oath to follow the principles of the institution, 
including discretion, intelligence, respect for others, and a spirit of temperance, 
courage, and dedication. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; see 
Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22–23 (describing an oath-swearing ceremony). 
 184. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 164. 
 185. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22. 
 186. Id. at 24. 
 187. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; see Nindorera, supra note 
148, at 22. 
 188. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 24. In case of a violation of a 
Mushingantahe’s agreement with the community, “the usual sanction was to 
chase him and his family from the neighborhood.” Id. 
 189. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 46; see, e.g., Jérôme 
Bigirimana, L’Institution burundaise des Bashingantahe s’exporte en Occident, 
ARIB NEWS (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.arib.info/index.php?option=com_ 
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2. Dispute Resolution and other Duties 
The three primary missions of the Bashingantahe are 
mediation, reconciliation, and arbitration.190 The 
Bashingantahe seek to settle disputes by reconciling the 
parties or rendering a judgment, based on the nature of the 
conflict. They attempt to reconcile individuals, families, and 
the colline.191 The Bashingantahe also perform duties similar 
to a notary, by authenticating and recording marriage, sale, 
and succession of land contracts.192 They oversee 
inheritances and allocate land held in trust.193 Traditionally, 
they held an advisory role to politicians, acting as 
kingmakers and a neutral check on the power of local 
chiefs.194 Today, the Bashingantahe still maintain their 
position as judicial and moral ombudsmen, separate from 
and outside the government.195 Others hold political office or 
an administrative position in their colline, acting as a formal 
representative.196 The Bashingantahe generally oversee the 
maintenance of justice, provide security for community 
members’ life and property, and emphasize respect for 
human rights and the common good.197 
The traditional process of conflict resolution usually 
begins with private mediation, followed by a public 
 
content&task=view&id=9606. 
 190. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156–157. 
 191. VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127–28; Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151; 
Makobero, supra note 143, at 32; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156. 
 192. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13–14; Nindorera, supra note 
148, at 12; VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127–28. 
 193. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156; see Kwizera, supra note 148, at 
151. 
 194. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 11; McClintock & Nahimana, 
supra note 144, at 86; Litanga, supra note 140, at 49. 
 195. McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 86; Nindorera, supra, note 
148, at 12. 
 196. In this respect, the Bashingantahe run as non-partisan candidates, and 
in some areas make up 20% of the local state administrators. SCHEYE, supra note 
141, at 18–19. 
 197. See Nindorera, supra note 148, at 14. 
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hearing.198 When parties bring a conflict to the 
Bashingantahe, they first seek a Mushingantahe to give 
advice and attempt to mediate between the parties before 
there is any hearing or decision-making.199 If the parties 
cannot be reconciled, then the Mushingantahe will convene 
the Bashingantahe council for arbitration.200 The 
Mushingantahe who the parties first contacted about the 
dispute may not sit on the council who will adjudicate the 
case.201 
Unlike the first reconciliation phase, the arbitration 
process is public and accusatory.202 The Bashingantahe 
convene a meeting of a panel, which is usually outdoors.203 
The panel typically consists of between three and five 
Bashingantahe, some of whom have designated roles such as 
president and secretary.204 Here, the council members 
officially become judges and render a decision. The parties 
first present their evidence without witnesses and the 
Bashingantahe question them.205 The parties take turns 
describing their version of the facts and the Bashingantahe 
repeat back the facts and arguments to show they 
understand the situation.206 This is meant to inspire a spirit 
of reconciliation and encourage parties to have an open mind, 
by making them listen to each other and hear the facts from 
a third party.207 
 
 198. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; Litanga, supra note 140, 
at 49. 
 199. Litanga, supra note 140, at 50. 
 200. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 46–47; Litanga, supra note 
140, at 50. 
 201. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.52. 
 202. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12. 
 203. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. 
 204. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.52. 
 205. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. 
 206. Id. at 12. 
 207. Id. 
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After Bashingantahe summon and interview witnesses, 
the Bashingantahe enter into secret deliberations until they 
reach a consensus on their decision.208 The facts of the case 
and the reasoning employed by the Bashingantahe are then 
explained to the parties and the attending public in 
“common-sense terms.”209 After the Bashingantahe give 
their decision, the party that first approached the 
Bashingantahe invite the other party and the Bashingantahe 
to have banana or sorghum beer, which is shared with all 
people present.210 This is done in the spirit of “celebrating 
and sealing the newly restored relationship” in front of the 
general public.211 Aside from this requirement, there is 
traditionally no fee to use the services of the 
Bashingantahe.212 
Compliance with the Bashingantahe’s decisions are 
voluntary, as they are not binding. The Bashingantahe do 
appoint a member of the community to oversee enforcement 
of the decision, but they do not have any coercive power 
themselves.213 They rely primarily on the wisdom and 
persuasiveness of their reasoning, although community-wide 
peer pressure and respect for the Bashingantahe play a role 
 
 208. Id. at 13. 
 209. Id. at 12. 
 210. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13; Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, 
supra note 141, at 47. 
 211. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. 
 212. Id. at 12. 
 213. Id. at 13. The Bashingantahe commonly use their influence to compel 
witnesses to appear before the council, which is an expression of the same social 
and moral authority they could use to encourage compliance. The use of social 
influence in this way is a common feature of traditional justice systems. “In order 
to restore harmony, therefore, there must be general satisfaction among the 
community at large, as well as the disputants, with the procedure and the 
outcome of the case. Public consensus is, moreover, necessary to ensure 
enforcement of the decision through social pressure.” Traditional & Informal 
Justice Systems: Traditional & Informal Justice & Peacebuilding Processes, 
PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVE, http://www.peacebuildinginitiative.org/indexc 
7b8.html?pageId=1876 (last updated Apr. 6, 2009) (internal citation omitted). 
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in incentivizing cooperation.214 
Since the revocation of the Bashingantahe’s formal legal 
authority by the Burundian government, the only approval 
or enforcement of Bashingantahe decisions are from local 
judges on an ad hoc basis. Some judges reference the 
Bashingantahe’s decisions for factual background of a case or 
hear appeals of them.215 For those parties who wish for an 
appeal, they may pursue their case in formal court, despite 
the perception that courts are slow, expensive and corrupt.216 
Other than through these soft controls and ad hoc 
affirmations by local judges, the arbitration decisions are not 
binding and Bashingantahe do not have the State’s coercive 
power to enforce decisions.217 
Decisions are reached based on customary law, guided by 
tradition and custom, which commonly places importance on 
extended families and values the community over 
individuals.218 The Bashingantahe usually convey their 
decisions through proverbs, axioms, or other traditional 
sayings, which serve as a sort of legal application of 
customary law.219 There appears to be no official adoption of 
precedent.220 Decisions are not always recorded, as some 
 
 214. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. “On the whole, the verdicts 
given by the Bashingantahe were accepted because they were recognized as fair 
and honest.” Josephine Ntahobari & Basilissa Ndayiziga, The Role of Burundian 
Women in the Peaceful Settlement of Conflicts, in WOMEN AND PEACE IN AFRICA 
11, 17 (UNESCO 2003). Social ostracism can be a significant behavioral control 
in this respect, influencing the actions of potential offenders and aiding the 
process of reintegrating those who did offend. TONY F. MARSHALL, U.K. HOME 
OFFICE RESEARCH DEV. & STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: AN 
OVERVIEW 30 (1999). 
 215. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 17–18; SCHEYE, supra note 
141, at 17. 
 216. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.51, 17–18; VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, 
at 128. 
 217. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. 
 218. Id. at 13. 
 219. See id.; Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. 
 220. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17–18. 
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Bashingantahe are illiterate, and a few Bashingantahe who 
do make recordings may require the parties to offer beer 
before releasing minutes of their meetings.221 
D. Deviation from bushingantahe and Progress Towards 
Improvement 
Although the Bashingantahe promote the 
bushingantahe principles of fairness, impartiality, and 
integrity in their decision-making, the local practice of the 
Bashingantahe varies and may not always represent the 
standards of the institution. For example, although some 
Bashingantahe intervened during the ethnic conflict in 
Burundi, others did not condemn the violence.222 Some of the 
Bashingantahe who were not selected by their communities 
are seen as falling short of the principles of the institution.223 
Bashingantahe also have not historically treated all ethnic 
groups or women equally. Despite these shortcomings, the 
Bashingantahe have maintained and improved their 
contribution towards society-wide justice and inclusion of 
ethnic groups and women. The continued prevalence of the 
Bashingantahe serves as evidence of the persistent effort to 
make these changes and better represent the virtues of 
bushingantahe. 
1. Bashingantahe and Vulnerable Groups 
There is some concern over vulnerable groups’ access to 
 
 221. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 21. 
 222. See VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 128. 
 223. Many Burundians have the view that the more Bashingantahe are chosen 
by political authorities, instead of the traditional investiture process, the less 
they are representative of the traditional values of integrity and impartiality, and 
are more likely they are to be corrupt. Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151; see VAN 
LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 128. Those that are political appointees are 
commonly selected based on membership in the ruling party, a diploma, or 
payment of a fee. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 14; see Mubiala, supra note 138, 
at 230. In the past, these appointees were commonly administrators and party 
bosses, and not invested traditionally. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, 
at 14–15. 
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the Bashingantahe. Primarily, the concern centers around 
women and Twa, an ethnic group in Burundi who 
traditionally were not part of the Bashingantahe system.224 
Twa are by far the smallest minority in Burundi, and are 
socially and economically marginalized due to their hunter-
gatherer lifestyle.225 According to legend, women once sat on 
Bashingantahe councils, but at some point they were 
banned.226 Access to an informal option for these vulnerable 
groups is especially important because they are even less 
likely to use formal methods of conflict resolution. For many, 
an informal conflict resolution mechanism may be their only 
avenue for access to justice.227 
A lack of women or Twa on a Bashingantahe council can 
have a role in determining the treatment of participants that 
include women or Twa.228 It may also have an effect on the 
willingness of those groups to come to the Bashingantahe 
with an issue, if they are prevented by fear of retaliation or 
social norms governing behavior.229 Some Burundians state 
Bashingantahe do not treat men and women equally, and 
suggest that it is part of a larger picture of gender inequality 
in Burundi, which affects all institutions, formal and 
informal.230 While the Bashingantahe are making efforts to 
include women and Twa in their councils, the issue of 
inequality remains. One example is that some 
 
 224. Id. at 10. 
 225. USAID, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESOURCE GOVERNANCE: BURUNDI 5 (2010). 
In Burundi, the Hutu make up roughly 85% of the population, the Tutsi roughly 
14%, and the Twa roughly 1%. McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 76. 
 226. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 14–15. 
 227. Kelsey Jones-Casey, Land is Thicker than Blood or Water in Burundi: 
Intra-Family Land Disputes in a ‘Post-Conflict’ State, U.S. INST. FOR PEACE: INT’L 
NETWORK FOR ECON. & CONFLICT (Jun. 9, 2013, 4:55 PM) (on file with author). 
 228. See, e.g., Kwizera, supra note 148, at 159–60 (according to their survey of 
community traditional leaders, community members, local government leaders 
and national representatives in Burundi, 32.1% said the Bashingantahe do not 
respect women and the youth). 
 229. See Jones-Casey, supra note 227. 
 230. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. 
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Bashingantahe do not enforce women’s right to inherit 
property, even though it is sanctioned by state law.231 
Women have increasingly become more involved with 
the institution.232 In some areas, wives of Bashingantahe 
were traditionally invested alongside their husbands, in a 
quasi-Bashingantahe status.233 This was called bapfasoni¸ a 
status that recognized one’s character, but without granting 
the right to deliberate or render judgment with 
Bashingantahe.234 Women could also participate in a parallel 
institution to the Bashingantahe, albeit limited to the female 
community. Respected women could be selected and sit on a 
council called Inararibonye.235 They would, like the 
Bashingantahe, convene a council to hear disputes between 
women, deliberate, and render a judgment or give advice to 
the parties.236 
Aside from the traditional facets of female involvement, 
the Bashingantahe have increasingly been investing women 
in their own right as full Bashingantahe since the 2000s.237 
For example, in some cases during the ethnic conflict, women 
judged as Bashingantahe, while men were absent.238 As 
another alternative, some villages began investing women as 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18. 
 233. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20; SCHEYE, supra note 
141, at 18. 
 234. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. Although their authority 
was sometimes limited to advising their husbands, women formed a necessary 
part of investiture. This was because men were not considered worthy to become 
Bashingantahe without being married, and the wife of a Mushingantahe was 
considered as much of a role model for the community as her husband. Nindorera, 
supra note 148, at 24, 26. 
 235. Meaning “those who have seen many things.” Ntahobari & Ndayiziga, 
supra note 214, at 20. 
 236. Id. 
 237. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18. 
 238. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 16. 
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Bashingantahe with their husbands.239 Like their husbands, 
women are given the same status, take an oath, may receive 
complaints, and may intervene in conflicts.240 In some areas, 
however, this is more limited and the intahe is given only to 
the husband—in this situation a woman’s authority as 
Bashingantahe may derive more from being a wife than 
being invested individually.241 There are also women who are 
invested as Bashingantahe themselves and act in their own 
capacity as a widow of a Mushingantahe.242 Burundians say 
that women now regularly sit on Bashingantahe panels, 
conducting public dispute resolution hearings and 
deliberating with the Bashingantahe council.243 
Women commonly bring their issues to Bashingantahe. 
Although there is disagreement, a plurality of a group of 
Bashingantahe interviewees stated that more women than 
men come for adjudication or mediation.244 Commonly, girls 
and adult women bring domestic violence cases and issues 
they may experience as a domestic worker.245 
Membership in the Bashingantahe today is open to any 
individual regardless of clan or ethnicity, which is notable 
and beneficial given the history of ethnicity-based conflict in 
the country’s history and the perceived bias towards Hutu or 
Tutsi in many formal institutions.246 Although Twa were 
traditionally excluded from investiture, some have become 
fully invested as Bashingantahe, with Twa Bashingantahe 
present in each Burundian province.247 There is still progress 
to be made, with the recognition that some Twa do not wish 
 
 239. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18. 
 240. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 167. 
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 242. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 167. 
 243. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18. 
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 246. See Nindorera, supra note 148, at 18. 
 247. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 10, 10 n.14. 
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to be invested as Bashingantahe, potentially due to the 
strong egalitarian roots of their culture.248 
2. Continued Prevalence of the Bashingantahe and 
bushingantahe 
Although the Bashingantahe have no legal standing, 
formal courts may recommend that conflicting parties see 
Bashingantahe and some will only hear cases that the 
Bashingantahe could not solve.249 A Burundian court often 
uses the minutes of Bashingantahe councils in its cases, uses 
a Mushingantahe as a witness in a court proceeding, or asks 
Bashingantahe to assist in the implementation of a ruling.250 
The tribunals reaffirmed the Bashingantahe’s decisions an 
average of 74.6% of the time from 1988 to 2003.251 People 
continue to bring their disputes to the Bashingantahe today, 
especially for complicated land disputes.252 According to one 
author, around 80% of disputes brought to the 
Bashingantahe are resolved without appeal.253 They still 
play a fundamental role in social cohesion and intervene in 
most family and neighborhood conflicts.254 
 
 248. Id. at 10; see JEROME LEWIS, MINORITY RIGHTS GRP. INT’L, THE BATWA 
PYGMIES OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION 8 (2000). 
 249. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 17–18; SCHEYE, supra note 
141, at 17. It seems that the Bashingantahe’s minutes and knowledge are used 
to clarify the factual issues underlying the presented dispute, as well as provide 
background information on the parties’ prior relationship. DEXTER & 
NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 18; see SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17. 
 250. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 18; SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 
17. 
 251. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 19. This corresponds with an 
interviewed group’s statement that formal courts affirm the Bashingantahe’s 
decision an estimated 75% to 80% of the time. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17. 
 252. See, e.g., Jillian Keenan, The Blood Cries Out, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 27, 
2015), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/27/the-blood-cries-out-burundi-land-
conflict/. 
 253. Charles Manga Fombad, Strengthening Constitutional Order and 
Upholding the Rule of Law in Central Africa: Reversing the Descent Towards 
Symbolic Constitutionalism, 14 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 412, 445–46 (2014). 
 254. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 46–47. 
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Although some Bashingantahe may act corruptly, 
traditionally invested Bashingantahe are usually accorded 
more trust and influence, particularly compared to other 
judges or government authorities.255 The ideals of the 
Bashingantahe also continue to be prevalent through many 
Burundians’ ad hoc selection of their neighbors or coworkers 
to mediate their disputes if they exhibit bushingantahe.256 
VI. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE BASHINGANTAHE 
The Bashingantahe show how an ADR program might 
function and what benefits it might gain by adopting similar 
principles and making similar improvements. The 
institution’s evolution to incorporate ad hoc selection of 
neighbors and coworkers who exhibit bushingantahe hints at 
the wider applicability and value of Bashingantahe ideals.257 
These respected individuals do not seem too far from 
informal arbitration in the United States. Moreover, 
Burundian complaints of a slow and expensive judicial 
system seem be echoed by many in the United States.258 ADR 
programs can learn from the Bashingantahe that the closer 
conflict resolution institutionary are to the people in conflict, 
in terms of their selection, access, and knowledge, the more 
respected, utilized, and effective the institution.259 
 
 255. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 18; Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 
47; Kwizera, supra note 148, at 154–55. The government’s act of co-opting the 
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 257. See Litanga, supra note 140, at 102. 
 258. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 3, 5–6; Sternlight, supra note 2, at 582, 
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 259. See Litanga, supra¸ note 140, at 70, 104–06. Comparing the authority of 
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The Bashingantahe exemplify how ADR can increase 
access to dispute resolution, preserve relationships among 
parties, increase efficiency, take advantage of informality, 
and use consent. They also show how an ADR system might 
function to best avoid the pitfalls of CAA and minimize the 
concerns about the inability of mediation to achieve social 
justice, the lack of public accountability, and the quality and 
ethical control over mediators. 
A. The Bashingantahe and the Benefits of ADR 
1. Access 
The Bashingantahe are accessible to everyday 
Burundians, and it remains a “natural” recourse for many.260 
This is particularly true for those who are poor, uneducated, 
or marginalized.261 The cost in time and money for each party 
is reduced due to the proximity of the Bashingantahe. They 
are physically located at the colline in which they operate 
and are available to the community within the community 
itself. This lowers the distance someone might have to travel 
to have a conflict solved, placing a lighter burden on time and 
money.262 They have an intimate knowledge of the 
background of many disputes that come before them, such as 
having witnessed the contract at issue.263 This means they 
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example of the value of proximity in increasing effectiveness of a method of 
conflict resolution is found in Venkatesh’s description of the underground 
economy of Chicago’s Southside and the clergy’s role in informal conflict 
resolution between police, gangs, and the community. VENKATESH, supra note 4, 
at 250–64. 
 260. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17–18. 
 261. Fombad, supra note 253, at 445–46. 
 262. See Bhat, supra note 13, at 49; see also BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 9 
(explaining how ADR can better serve disadvantaged groups). 
 263. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. While the Bashingantahe 
often have background information on the property or issue at the center of a 
dispute, it does seem that they seek to maintain a sort of de novo review of the 
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require less time to become informed on the facts of the case. 
This is more accessible than the formal court system in 
Burundi, where resolution of a conflict can take up to ten 
years, and courts often do not have the funds to travel to local 
villages.264 
In principle, consulting the Bashingantahe is free, 
although the party bringing the case is expected to share 
beer after a resolution, and there are some instances where 
a Mushingantahe will require beer or a fee before hearing the 
case or to release meeting minutes.265 The remedies assigned 
by the Bashingantahe are more affordable than the formal 
courts as well.266 The Bashingantahe are closer, cheaper, and 
faster than the formal courts, which benefits parties who 
otherwise would not be able to access conflict resolution. This 
also benefits the courts when they use Bashingantahe or 
information from their hearings in the courts’ proceedings. 
2. Preserving Relationships 
ADR can help preserve relationships of people and 
businesses when the program is designed to encourage 
parties to engage each other and discuss the problem 
neutrally.267 The Bashingantahe and their traditions place a 
heavy emphasis on reconciliation of parties, distinguishing it 
from the adversarial mindset of litigation.268 
 
dispute. For example, the Mushingantahe who first received the complaint recuse 
themselves from the panel hearing the parties. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 
n.52. 
 264. BROWN ET AL., supra note 53, at 9; DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, 
at 20; SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.51. 
 265. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12–13, 21. 
 266. Fombad, supra note 253, at 446. 
 267. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2241; Bhat, supra note 13, at 49. 
 268. The Bashingantahe depend on the parties’ satisfaction with the result of 
the resolution and their relationship to ensure compliance with the decision. See 
DEXTER & NTAHOMNBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. Reconciliation, as opposed to a 
zero-sum mindset, is one of the fundamental principles of the Bashingantahe, 
and parties must attempt it before any further hearing can continue. Naniwe-
Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 156–57; Litanga, supra note 140, at 50. 
208 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
Bashingantahe are selected in a way that encourages the 
preservation of relationships. They are invested based on 
their impartiality, fairness, and discretion, with an eye 
towards how they can repair harmony in families and 
villages.269 With a procedural step that attempts to preserve 
a relationship, and a beer-sharing ceremony to cement that 
reconciliation, the Bashingantahe show their focus on 
repairing parties’ relationships.270 They have proven their 
institution can do as much, having reconciled criminals and 
victims during the ethnic conflict.271 
3. Efficiency 
The swiftness with which Burundians report the 
Bashingantahe handle their conflicts, along with their 
 
 269. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 155. It could be fair to question 
whether a Mushingantahe would favor one side over the other or jump to 
conclusions based on personal knowledge of one’s past behavior, given that the 
Bashingantahe are members of the community themselves, the use of secret 
deliberations, and the fact that many Bashingantahe hearing a dispute likely 
know the surrounding factual history. In the United States, we may similarly 
question whether impartiality and fairness could be maintained with few 
procedural safeguards, solely based on a determination of a community that a 
person is generally impartial and fair, like the selection process described above. 
See supra pp. 25–26. This concern betrays the differences between Burundian 
and American cultural presuppositions on how to best protect impartiality and 
fairness in an institution. In a discussion of concepts of “good governance,” Peter 
Uvin describes how Burundians generally tend to focus less on structural 
safeguards: 
[T]he overwhelming majority of Burundians do not demand the Western 
institutions of democracy . . . . They care far more for security and 
minimal development than for elections or human rights laws. At the 
same time, they deeply desire equity, respect, [and] an end to corruption. 
Burundians have a language, a set of values, to describe better 
governance with, and it is the language of the institution of 
bashingantahe. A deep adherence to values of truth, justice, [and] non-
discrimination appeared everywhere in our conversations [with 
interviewees]. While at first sight similar to Western concepts of human 
rights and good governance, this bashingantahe-inspired notion of 
respect is less focused on ‘right structures’ and more on ‘good people.’ 
UVIN, supra note 155, at 78. 
 270. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12. 
 271. Id. at 16; Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 160–61. 
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knowledge of the situation and parties before the conflict 
arises, is relevant to efficiency as much as it is to 
accessibility.272 Fewer delays and faster resolution means 
those who are otherwise priced out of the ADR market may 
now access it.273 
Even without access to coercive capabilities like the 
formal courts, the Bashingantahe are successful at resolving 
disputes at the local level. Bashingantahe resolve an 
estimated 80% of disputes taken to them.274 This is 
significant, given the Bashingantahe’s decisions are not 
binding. Of the controls the Bashingantahe have over 
compliance with their decisions, some may be more difficult 
and contentious to replicate than others, such as a high level 
of social ostracism for those who do not comply with their 
decisions. Using tools such as explaining their reasoning, 
compromising parties’ desires, having a high court 
affirmation rate, and appointing someone to oversee 
enforcement of the decision may be reasonable steps that 
ensure compliance with the decision.275 Successfully resolved 
conflicts mean the parties spend less resources rehashing the 
same problem through a different method. 
Some suggest that ADR programs should limit recitation 
of the law to oral presentation without briefs to increase 
efficiency.276 While some Bashingantahe hearings lack any 
written record, and so practice this in effect, this option does 
have the possibility of hurting the efficiency and accuracy of 
an appeal.277 
 
 272. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. 
 273. See Wood, supra note 16, at 449. 
 274. Fombad, supra note 253, at 445. 
 275. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13, 19; Naniwe-Kaburahe, 
supra note 11, at 166. “On the whole, the verdicts given by the Bashingantahe 
were accepted because they were recognized as fair and honest.” Ntahobari & 
Ndayiziga, supra note 214, at 17. 
 276. See, e.g., Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 127. 
 277. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13 
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4. Informality 
Reliance on custom and tradition leads the 
Bashingantahe to function informally, giving them the 
flexibility to tailor solutions to a unique and complicated 
problem.278 Informalism makes the main benefit of ADR 
possible: “the production of mutually beneficial resolutions of 
problems on the parties’ own terms.”279 It tolerates mercy 
and a focus on reconciliation between the parties more than 
the formal system.280 
With the Bashingantahe, informality allows parties to 
choose an arbitrator or mediator whom they trust and who 
has specialized knowledge of their matter.281 Traditionally, 
potential parties select, with the rest of the community, the 
Bashingantahe that may one day hear their dispute, 
according to who they think exhibit ideal qualities for 
adjudication and mediation. Although it does not seem that 
parties may decide which Bashingantahe sit on the council 
during their adjudication, parties may choose which 
Mushingantahe they wish to approach to first mediate the 
dispute.282 
Parties continue to informally approach respected 
individuals who exhibit bushingantahe, but are not invested 
as Bashingantahe, showing how informality gives them 
choice over a mediator. The lack of a strict adherence to 
precedent or procedural rules and reference to custom are 
what give rise to the benefits of a low cost system, which 
avoids a win-lose mindset, and supports repairing of 
 
 278. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 4–5. 
 279. Id. at 7. 
 280. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 73, at 69. 
 281. The ability to informally choose an arbitrator is also present in the United 
States. See, e.g., VENKATESH, supra note 4, at 250–64 (discussing using ad hoc 
selection of community members for informal conflict resolution in parts of 
Chicago). 
 282. See SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17 n.52; Litanga, supra note 140, at 50. 
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relationships.283 
5. Consent 
Bashingantahe decisions are not binding, and there is a 
lack of power of enforcement, rendering the institution 
voluntary. Although this opens up their decisions to non-
compliance, the Bashingantahe seem to manage this risk 
through social influence, peer pressure, wisdom and 
persuasiveness of reasoning, trying to meet the desires of the 
parties, and appointing someone to oversee enforcement.284 
The benefit of consent is that by feeling they had a role 
in selecting the mediator and choosing to participate in the 
process, the parties may be more likely to comply with the 
decision.285 Parties exercise consent by selecting the 
Mushingantahe they wish to first bring the dispute to for 
reconciliation, and likely by selecting many of the 
Bashingantahe who sit on the council in their colline. Given 
that any member of the community can oppose the 
investiture of a Mushingantahe, the consent of the wider 
public to be judged by that person can be implied. 
An alternative explanation is that consent to the process 
does not make parties more inclined to comply, but that 
parties who are more inclined to settle and comply are more 
likely to choose ADR.286 In this case, the Bashingantahe are 
filling a demand for voluntary arbitration. According to this 
idea, requiring a party to use the institution and making the 
decisions binding imposes decisions on those who are not 
more inclined to negotiate and settle. The mediation would 
likely be less successful if one or both of the parties do not 
want to negotiate and only want to litigate. Mandating these 
kinds of parties to attend mediation would use time and 
resources that could be better used resolving another 
 
 283. See Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 7. 
 284. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13 
 285. Spangler, supra note 12. 
 286. Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2243. 
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conflict.287 
Assuming a functioning and accessible formal court 
system, an ADR program can tolerate some noncompliance, 
for the sake of vindicating legal rights that are sometimes 
not recognized in ADR. While the Bashingantahe have made 
progress towards greater inclusion of women and Twa as full 
members, there is still concern over their treatment as 
parties in a dispute, given their lower social standing in 
Burundian culture.288 The reliance on consent would enable 
a party whose legal rights were violated in a mediation or 
arbitration decision to reject the decision and claim those 
rights in formal court.289 For example, a woman who has a 
right to inherit property under formal Burundian law might 
not be able to find Bashingantahe who would enforce it.290 
Such a person could potentially seek to enforce those rights 
by the formal court, assuming an accessible and functioning 
formal court. 
Consent plays a role in encouraging compliance, as the 
Bashingantahe cannot necessarily enforce compliance.291 A 
voluntary system attracts those who wish to cooperate with 
the Bashingantahe’s decision. In a larger view, the reliance 
on consent is also advancing the public interests of enhanced 
self-determination and the parties’ respect for each other.292 
Consenting to and taking an active role in mediation with 
another party can serve as “civic education” that builds a 
 
 287. See id. 
 288. See, e.g., DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13. This concern is 
reflected in the United States, as it pertains to women and other minority 
populations. See Yamamoto, supra note 49, at 1059–60. The ability of informal 
ADR programs to address society-wide injustice and involvement with these 
groups is discussed later in this Comment. See infra pp. 215–22. 
 289. See Bernstein, supra note 22, at 2243. 
 290. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 13, 20, 39; see VAN LEEUWEN, 
supra note 155, at 128. 
 291. See the discussion of the reliance on persuasiveness of reasoning and 
social norms to encourage compliance, supra pp. 198–99 and accompanying notes. 
 292. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 36 (internal citation omitted). 
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capacity for consideration and respect for other groups by 
listening and responding to their case, and is a way to reverse 
learned dependency on outside experts and institutions.293 
B. The Bashingantahe and the Criticisms of ADR 
Even if a system of ADR is democratic, in that it is 
controlled by and proximate to the people who use it, some 
suggest that ADR just adds another layer of litigation to the 
court system. Besides, ADR is private and informal, which 
can be hostile to the rule of law and detrimental to achieving 
justice. Some of the actions of the Bashingantahe show how 
an institution of ADR can advance the ideals of social justice, 
inside and outside the context of arbitration. They show how 
an ADR program might effectuate public accountability and 
minimize the risks of informality, such as unqualified or 
unethical mediators. One of the key aspects of the institution 
is reconciliation through mediation.294 Because of this focus, 
the Bashingantahe structure does not form another layer of 
litigation underneath the formal judicial system—it provides 
reconciliation.295 
1. ‘Just Another Layer to the Court System’ 
Although the Bashingantahe were co-opted as an 
auxiliary to the courts in the past and today local judges still 
refer cases to the Bashingantahe, the service they provide is 
reconciliation, not litigation.296 This means the 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12–14, 18–20; VAN LEEUWEN, 
supra note 155, at 127. 
 295. See SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17. Litigation and mediation may overlap 
in that they may result in the same legal outcome, but the goals are not the same. 
The themes of “fairness, discretion, natural justice, and good conscience” 
characterize equity and are prevalent in mediation. They are sometimes 
considered “anti-legal elements” and tend to disappear from conflict resolution 
mechanisms as the mechanism formalizes because they may not coincide with 
statutorily created penalties or rights. Nolan-Haley, supra note 73, at 58–62; see 
VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127. 
 296. SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 17. 
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Bashingantahe have a different function, and so they do not 
operate as an extra layer of litigation beneath the formal 
court system. 
The Bashingantahe’s primary goal of reconciliation 
counters the mindset of approaching ADR like a zero-sum 
game.297 The Bashingantahe use a conciliatory tone and 
focus on continuing the relationship between the parties, 
much like a mediator between two businesses might use a 
positive tone to express the benefits of continuing to do 
business with each other.298 
The Bashingantahe are natural and neutral expert 
witnesses themselves.299 The presence of a neutral expert 
witness pressures the parties to negotiate and furthers the 
goal of reaching a conciliatory solution. Whereas the 
presence of a partisan expert causes the parties to harden 
their positions according to the testimonies of divergent 
witnesses, a neutral expert takes certain facts out of 
contention and prevents parties from manipulating some 
facts to their benefit.300 
For parties who truly want to litigate, or act like they do, 
ADR will likely not be able to reconcile them. These parties 
will most likely appeal the arbitration decision and proceed 
onto litigation, with less time and money to spare.301 
Mediation should serve those who wish to reconcile, and the 
 
 297. A zero-sum approach to mediation increases expenses and time and 
makes the mediation less likely to succeed. A possible preliminary flaw of ADR 
is when “litigious habits worm their way into the process,” and the “mediation” 
begins to balloon with excess motions, discovery, depositions, and witnesses. 
Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 120–21. 
 298. Compare Mubiala, supra note 138, at 230 (describing how the 
Bashingantahe promote a positive relationship between parties), with Carver & 
Vondra, supra note 8, at 129 (describing how a mediator promotes a positive 
relationship between parties). 
 299. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12; see e.g., Keenan, supra 
note 252. 
 300. Carver & Vondra, supra note 8, at 128. 
 301. See, e.g., Brooker, supra note 2, at 14, 23, 25. 
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structure of the Bashingantahe encourages this by being 
voluntary.302 
The simplified procedures, swifter process, focus on 
reconciliation, and lack of a penalty for appealing a decision 
to the formal court make the Bashingantahe function less 
like a lower-level trial court or CAA program. Instead, it is a 
separate institution that provides a separate service: equity 
through mediation under its own brand of customary law. 
Like those who voluntarily choose ADR, the Burundians’ 
continued use of the Bashingantahe demonstrate a demand 
for reconciliation, around which the institution is structured 
to serve. 
1. Social Justice Concerns 
a. Inclusion of Vulnerable Groups 
One concern of ADR is that its informal and private 
nature makes it ineffective at achieving social justice, in the 
sense that it does not protect parties that have significantly 
different power and status.303 But the changes the 
Bashingantahe have made towards its treatment of 
vulnerable groups show how an ADR program could make 
process towards checking cultural biases and ensuring fair 
decisions. 
The members of the community select Mushingantahe on 
the basis of their fairness, impartiality, and respect for 
human rights, who then must agree to uphold those 
principles.304 The arbitration is traditionally free, and so the 
 
 302. See Ntahobari & Ndayiziga, supra note 214, at 17. This is said with the 
recognition that many do not have the option of pursuing formal litigation in 
Burundi because of the lack of access. See SCHEYE, supra note 141, at 22. 
 303. Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 5, 30; Laura Nader, Controlling Processes 
in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in the Movement to Re-form 
Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 14 (1993) (arguing that the 
unwritten, informal law of mediation avoids “[d]iscussion of blame or rights,” and 
is “replaced by the rhetoric of compromise and relationship,” which “thereby 
obscur[es] issues of unequal social power”); Sternlight, supra note 2, at 570–71. 
 304. Nindorera, supra note 148, at 22; Litanga¸ supra note 140, at 49; see 
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advantage and influence of money is reduced.305 Their 
hearings are in public, they have an intimate knowledge of 
the circumstances of the dispute, and the explanation of the 
Bashingantahe’s reasoning is in common-sense terms.306 As 
a result, the public has a better opportunity to recognize 
manifested prejudice and may select a different 
Mushingantahe to approach with a conflict or could run the 
biased Mushingantahe out of the village for an egregious 
violation of the oath. 
Although some Bashingantahe are accused of partiality, 
the Bashingantahe’s procedures and involvement of Twa and 
women show a degree of public control over the informal 
hearings. They also show the responsibility the 
Bashingantahe feel towards the community and their 
resulting efforts to remain fair. As the Bashingantahe take 
steps to remain proximate in their selection process, explain 
decisions, and better involve vulnerable groups, the public 
can better check bias.307 
b. Micro- and Macrosocial Justice 
The Bashingantahe show how an ADR program might be 
structured to better produce “macro-level” changes to social 
 
Kwizera, supra note 148, at 152. 
 305. See Bhat, supra note 13, at 49. 
 306. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12. Although the hearings are 
public, the Bashingantahe deliberations are in secret. Id. at 13. In spite of the 
secret deliberations, however, Burundians view multi-person panels as more 
trustworthy than a single decision-maker like a judge in the court system. See 
Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 51. 
 307. This is said with the recognition that if the entire public is biased, then 
they likely will not be a check on similarly biased mediators. Social-wide norms 
then may not be the sole fault of the arbiter or mediators, and so the solution 
would be to change the norms of the public as much as it would be to change the 
norms of the ADR system. Still, the continued inclusion of women and Twa in the 
institution will likely aid in checking bias in decision-making. It may be one of 
the reasons why surveyed Burundians felt that Bashingantahe made their 
decisions without regard to sex, wealth, age, physical condition, ethnicity or 
political membership. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. 
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justice.308 
Both the community and the Bashingantahe have 
methods to change or develop the principles by which the 
Bashingantahe arbitrate. At Bashingantahe hearings, 
villagers may come to listen and give an opinion.309 Also, the 
villagers exercise some localized control over investment and 
disinvestment of the mediators. The community can use 
their involvement as a lever to effectuate changes at the 
macro-level. The Bashingantahe can also choose to make 
decisions to advance the equality of parties, or otherwise 
contribute to social justice. The Bashingantahe have adapted 
their traditions and customs to advance social justice 
through their growing inclusion of women and Twa. The 
Bashingantahe can also interpret and apply the principles of 
bushingantahe to promote macro-justice, similar to a system 
of judge-made law.310 When the Bashingantahe are 
“speaking the law” in arbitration, they can modify customary 
law “in the service of social evolution.”311 
Moreover, macro-level social justice can be achieved 
through the many actions that produce policy change, such 
as “legislative enactments, changes in legal doctrine, or 
shifts in political power.”312 The Bashingantahe have a 
history of working outside the sphere of mediation to support 
justice at the macro-level.313 They have acted as 
 
 308. See generally Bush & Folger, supra note 27, at 3–4 (explaining how ADR 
can produce macro-level social equality by distributing micro-level justice to 
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 309. Ntahobari & Ndayiziga, supra note 214, at 17. 
 310. The Bashingantahe apply customary law, and make decisions based on 
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representatives of their colline and mobilized groups to 
arrest killers and looters during ethnic violence.314 The 
Bashingantahe educate the public about their rights and 
teach them respect for the law.315 The National Council of 
Bashingantahe makes public statements condemning sexual 
violence and supporting the freedom of the press.316 The 
Bashingantahe also played a nation-wide role in reconciling 
offenders after the ethnic conflict.317 
Local control over the Bashingantahe and their 
interpretation of bushingantahe can be used to advance 
social justice on a macro-level. The Bashingantahe have also 
taken steps that show that arbitrators and mediators can act 
outside their role and serve as community organizers and 
representatives who contribute to social justice. 
2. Public Accountability Concerns 
The Bashingantahe are public figures and their 
investment and contract with their community makes clear 
their accountability to the public. The local involvement is a 
source of legitimacy under which they make decisions on 
moral and legal questions and interpret the public values 
encompassed by bushingantahe.318 The dispute resolution 
process is transparent, as the public may watch and 
 
 314. Naniwe-Kaburahe, supra note 11, at 160–61. 
 315. Makobero, supra note 143, at 31, 36. 
 316. E.g., Déclaration du Conseil National des Bashingantahe du 17 septembre 
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 317. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 16. 
 318. See McClintock & Nahimana, supra note 144, at 86. 
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contribute to the discussion.319 Therefore, the Bashingantahe 
have a degree of democratic legitimacy to speak for the 
interests of the community.320 
The history of the Bashingantahe shows that with public 
involvement in the process, through selection of arbitrators 
or witnessing hearings, an ADR system can be designed to 
maintain public accountability. Without public involvement, 
a conflict resolution system stands to lose legitimacy, as it 
did with those Bashingantahe who were appointed by the 
government. When the institution was vertically integrated, 
it became untrusted because the state co-opted control of the 
Bashingantahe from the colline.321 The connection the 
Bashingantahe have with their communities is the vehicle of 
public accountably. 
3. Quality and Ethical Concerns 
ADR also raises the question of how to ensure mediators 
are ethical and of good quality. Mediation often relies heavily 
on the mediator’s skill for the effort to succeed.322 Even with 
sufficient skill, a mediator could be misled by an incomplete 
view of the facts surrounding the dispute and possibly 
without the procedural tools to request more information.323 
One solution is the creation of a professional arbitrator 
or mediator corps, along with set ethical standards or 
competency tests.324 But a requirement to use such a 
professionalized corps before the ability to sue in a court 
effectively creates a lower tier of courts, but without formal 
procedural protections.325 The Bashingantahe function as a 
 
 319. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12. 
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corps of professional arbitrators and mediators, and they 
have the benefit of accumulating experience and expertise 
through repeated exposure to disputes and devising 
solutions. However, they avoid the issues of a lower tier of 
courts, because the institution is voluntary. Parties may 
alternatively go through the courts or to another mediator, 
such as a respected neighbor or coworker.326 Through a 
mediator corps, mediators can develop general dispute 
resolution experience, like how the Bashingantahe or career 
judges would accumulate on-the-job expertise over time.327 
It would likely be difficult to replicate the intimate 
knowledge Bashingantahe have of parties’ cases and 
circumstances outside the context of a small village or local 
neighborhood. The information a Mushingantahe has gained 
through day-to-day observation of behavior and agreements 
relies heavily on face-to-face interaction with local 
constituents.328 A mediator in another context may not be 
able to have this level of prior face-to-face interaction with 
the parties before they have a dispute. One way to address 
this may be to use a group or panel in arbitration, like the 
Bashingantahe. Decision-making in groups can sometimes 
aid a lack of technical expertise by using “combined 
expertise,” as one member of a panel may be able to inform 
or compensate for another.329 
But even without intimate knowledge, the arbitrator’s 
knowledge of the context of the dispute will aid the quality of 
the decision. There is a degree to which a mediator may be 
able to understand a community’s broader context and social 
values if the mediator operates in the locality and is 
“organically connected” to the community, like the 
Bashingantahe. At least these mediators would be more 
 
 326. Although the Bashingantahe were designated as a lower tier of courts in 
the past. VAN LEEUWEN, supra note 155, at 127. 
 327. See Wood, supra note 16, at 447. 
 328. See DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20. 
 329. See Wood, supra note 16, at 447–48. 
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likely to have a basic understanding of the values by which 
the public would like the dispute to be resolved. 
The community’s judgement exercised in selection and 
disinvestment suffices for an effective competency test and 
ethical standard in the case of the Bashingantahe. The 
qualities desired for a Mushingantahe, such as credibility, 
intelligence, and integrity, are made clear throughout the 
observation and selection process. 
Mediators and arbitrators may also be corrupt, or 
develop biases against a party, and without a check on these 
actions, the result of a negotiation could be skewed.330 
Corrupt Bashingantahe exist, particularly where the state 
has wrested control of the selection process from the local 
communities.331 Where the local community retains control, 
they still take action to monitor corruption and control 
violations of a Mushingantahe’s oath to be honest, impartial, 
and fair through disinvestment or banishment.332 
Promoting local control over local mediators and 
arbitrators is not to say the state could not provide a 
competency test or ethical standard as well. State 
involvement or regulation should be balanced so that it does 
not substitute local control over the mediators for its own 
control. The experience of the Bashingantahe shows that 
distancing communities from the selection process removes 
a tool they have for quality control and public 
accountability.333 
Each colline has a role in ensuring sufficient quality of 
 
 330. Sternlight, supra note 2, at 587. 
 331. Ingelaere & Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 47. For example, a requirement 
to provide beer upfront before Bashingantahe hear a case is like an unauthorized 
fee, instead of a shared gift at the end of the ceremony. See DEXTER & 
NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 20, 20 n.51. 
 332. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 12. 
 333. See Kwizera, supra note 148, at 151–52. Comparing the relevance of the 
Bashingantahe to the Gacaca provides this principle as well. See supra note 259 
and accompanying text. 
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the Bashingantahe. Certain aspects of the institution, such 
as using a multi-person panel and maintaining connection to 
the community help to make sure the Bashingantahe are 
making quality decisions. These are tools to prevent and 
correct corruption and systematic unfair decisions by a 
Mushingantahe. 
VII.CONCLUSION 
While the Bashingantahe have room for improvement, 
including a need for more training, greater scrutiny of 
corruption, greater involvement of vulnerable groups, and 
maintaining community involvement, their methods and 
principles offer potential solutions to many of the core 
concerns surrounding ADR.334 As ADR programs struggle 
with striking a balance between formalism and informalism, 
many mix the two doctrines and end up with a program that 
suffers from the problems of formalism while achieving none 
of the benefits of informalism.335 Adherence to some degree 
of informalism may be necessary for an ADR program to 
effectively deliver on the promised benefits of increased 
access, preservation of relationships, greater efficiency, 
informality, and consent. 
The example of the Bashingantahe can serve as advice 
on how to best avoid the pitfalls of ADR, by promoting social 
justice, increasing public accountability, and ensuring 
mediators are qualified and held to ethical standards. The 
Bashingantahe’s answer is a system designed to be 
proximate to the community it serves, meaning that its 
flexible, informal nature can be used and adapted by the 
community to meet their needs. An ADR system with public 
selection of mediators or arbitrators, easier access, and 
mediators or arbitrators with more knowledge or 
understanding of the community results in a more respected, 
 
 334. DEXTER & NTAHOMBAYE, supra note 142, at 7–8. 
 335. See generally Wood, supra note 16, at 453–56 (explaining how efforts to 
balance informalism with formalism can hurt the ADR process). 
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utilized, and effective institution. 
In practice, this means ADR programs need to have a 
corps of mediators or arbitrators who are selected and 
evaluated by the communities they serve. This gives the 
community the ability to select those who have a certain 
degree of expertise or quality, or who match their values. 
ADR would not be a lower tier of the court system, acting as 
an additional forum for litigation, but could instead provide 
a different kind of public good or service, such as 
reconciliation of parties. Because the mediators and 
arbitrators are qualified to represent the voice of the 
community, they can expand their role outside of conflict 
resolution, and contribute to macro-level social justice as 
community organizers and mobilizers. 
Increased local public involvement in selection and the 
process of ADR can be a check on bias and prejudice in an 
otherwise informal setting. ADR programs could also 
accomplish this by increasing the inclusion of vulnerable 
groups as mediators and arbitrators and use multi-member 
panels for adjudication. A multi-member panel also could 
have the benefit of increasing quality of the decisions and 
preventing opportunity for corruption. 
If the arbitrators and mediators have an organic 
connection to the community, they are more likely to have 
better knowledge of the circumstances of the parties and 
their dispute, or at least the broader context of the 
community. This equates to more accurate decisions and 
more satisfied parties, meaning a greater chance of 
voluntary compliance. If the arbitrators are locally based, 
that also means cheaper and easier access for the parties who 
have a dispute. 
An ADR program of this style should also be voluntary 
and non-binding. In a voluntary and non-binding program, 
parties are not channeled into a system that lacks procedural 
protections and infringes on their legal rights without their 
consent. It gives the parties an ability for recourse, and 
incentivizes the mediators to try to find common ground and 
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be effective if they wish to be utilized. 
The methods and principles of the institution, centered 
around preserving democratic legitimacy through proximity 
to the public, give parties access to a way of resolving 
conflicts without lengthy proceedings, high costs, and 
destroying relationships. The Bashingantahe show this can 
be achieved with a sufficient degree of public accountability 
to ensure fairness and quality in their judgements. Parties 
must choose which forum they want to solve a dispute and in 
some cases a formal court may be the best answer. But when 
parties select ADR, the program should take the ideas of the 
Bashingantahe into consideration so it can better provide an 
efficient and fair solution. 
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APPENDIX: GLOSSARY OF TERMS336 
Term Definition 
Bapfasoni 
The status traditionally given to a 
wife of a Mushingantahe; related to 
ubufasoni.  
Bashingantahe 




The traditional council made up of 
Bashingantahe.  
Bushingantahe 
Pronounced ubu shing’ ga ta’ he. The 
set of virtues that include justice, 
honesty, self-esteem, and an ethic of 
hard work. Roughly summed up as 
“integrity.”  
Colline 
“Hill” in French, but it is an 
administrative unit that 
encompasses several hills, similar to 
a spread-out village or neighborhood. 
Inararibonye 
“Those who have seen many things.” 
Traditionally, the council of women 
that settled conflicts among women.  
Intahe 
“Stick of justice,” symbolizing the 
authority of a Mushingantahe. 
Mushingantahe 
An adult who exemplifies 
bushingantahe; a “wise man.”  
Ubufasoni  




 336. This glossary is adapted from Nindorera, supra note 148, at 32. 
Throughout academic literature on this subject, different authors refer to these 
words differently. Most involve differences in spelling, such as using Batwa 
where another author uses Twa, or Abashingantahe and Bashingantahe. I have 
used the shorter labels for the sake of consistency. There is also confusion over 
whether to interpret Bashingantahe to mean the people and the institution or 
just the people, and whether to interpret bushingantahe as the name of the 
institution or the set of values. I adopt the definitions above, as used by Ingelaere 
& Kohlhagen, supra note 141, at 48–49. 
